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1 Introduction 
 
In Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd1 the appellant 
sought to enforce a copyright2 claim in computer programmes3 against Brewers 
Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd. His claim was dismissed in the High Court (court a 
quo), whereupon he appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The primary 
objective of this case note is to analyse some of the legal principles relevant to 
issues of copyright ownership in computer programmes as highlighted in the 
judgment of this case. More importantly, the contribution addresses the 
shortcomings of the Copyright Act4 in so far as the issue of unauthorised adaptation 
of computer programmes is concerned. It will be argued that the protection afforded 
by the Act5 to copyright owners of computer programmes is very narrowly defined. It 
is not wide enough to prevent unauthorised adaptation of computer programmes. 
The issue that will be considered therefore is whether or not the unauthorised 
adaptation of computer programmes should attract a criminal sanction. In addressing 
this issue and with the aim of making recommendations, the legal position in the 
United Kingdom (UK) will be analysed. The UK has enacted legislation that 
                                                          
 Linda Muswaka. LLB, LLM (University of Fort Hare) Lecturer, Faculty of Law: School of 
Postgraduate Studies and Research, North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, South 
Africa. E-mail: linda.muswaka@nwu.ac.za. 
1  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA). 
2  Copyright is a form of intellectual property which gives the creator of original work exclusive 
rights over that work to do or authorise others to do certain acts in relation to that work for a 
certain period. The aim of copyright is to allow authors to have control of and profit from 
their works, thus encouraging them to create new works and to aid the flow of ideas and 
learning. In South Africa copyright is regulated by the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. S 41(4) of 
the Act stipulates that "no copyright or right in the nature of copyright shall subsist 
otherwise than by virtue of this Act or of some other enactment in that behalf." 
3  Certain defined works, of which computer programmes are one class, are eligible for 
copyright under the Act (s 2). Until 1992, the Act listed "computer programmes" as literary 
works. Currently computer programmes are listed separately and enjoy copyright protection in 
South Africa as a sui generis copyright item (s 2(1)). See also Northern Office Microcomputers v 
Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C). 
4  Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
5  Section 27(1) Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
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particularly addresses computer crime.6 The justification for focusing on the UK lies 
in the fact that English law has been very influential in this specific branch of law.7 
 
2 Factual background 
 
The appellant, Anton Charl Haupt,8 had been employed as a marketing director by 
the first respondent, Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd.9  Christopher John 
Brewer,10 the second respondent, who also happened to be the brother-in-law of 
Haupt, was the sole shareholder of Brewers Ltd. The company did business as an 
advertising agency and also disseminated information of use to the advertising 
industry. During 1998 the third respondent, Byron Coetzee,11 was requested by 
Brewers Ltd to write a computer programme which could interrogate and manipulate 
All Media Products Survey (AMPS) data.12 Coetzee developed a computer 
programme known as the Project AMPS programme for this purpose. The 
programme was approaching beta stage13 when Haupt parted ways with Brewer on 
31 July 1998 and started trading as Softcopy. Thereafter, in terms of a prior 
arrangement with Haupt, Coetzee continued to develop the programme for Haupt 
exclusively.14 After 31 July 1998 Haupt exercised control over the development of 
                                                          
6  The Computer Misuse Act 1990. The focus of this contribution will, however, be on 
unauthorised modifications of computer programmes. Hence, the other crimes in terms of 
this Act will not be discussed. 
7  The history of the copyright law of South Africa can be traced from the Patents, Trade 
Marks, Designs and Copyright Act 9 of 1916, which was the first piece of legislation that 
recognised an author's right to copyright. This Act effectively adopted the UK Imperial 
Copyright Act 1911 as South African law. The system that South Africa inherited from the 
UK was based on the world's very first piece of copyright legislation, the 1709 Statute of 
Anne. When South Africa became a Republic in 1961, Parliament enacted its own copyright 
law, separate from that of the UK, in the Copyright Act 63 of 1965. Nonetheless, this Act 
was largely based on the UK Copyright Act 1956. In 1978 it was replaced by the Copyright 
Act 68 of 1978, which (as amended) remains in force. The 1978 Act draws both from British 
law and from the text of the Berne Convention. 
8  Hereafter Haupt. 
9  Hereafter Brewers Ltd. 
10  Hereafter Brewer. 
11  Hereafter Coetzee. 
12  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 3. AMPS data 
are research results produced by a media research company on behalf of the South Afri can 
Advertising Research Foundation. AMPS data are based on market surveys done on a six-
monthly basis by way of questionnaires and are available in binary column electronic format 
stored in a UFL file and captured on a compact disc. They enable one inter alia to 
determine who the readers, listeners or viewers of particular newspapers, magazines, radio 
stations or television programmes are and who the users of various products are.  
13  Pre-final stage. 
14  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 5. 
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this programme.15 He changed the name of the programme to Data Explorer. 
Coetzee inter alia developed and incorporated a "tree-preparer" computer 
programme. In the beginning of 1999 Coetzee developed various database 
structures. In June 2000 Coetzee developed and added another computer 
programme referred to as the "converter program." Coetzee worked full-time for a 
period of two months for Haupt and was paid a salary of R20 000-00 per month. 
Coetzee left South Africa in 2000 and moved to the United States of America (USA). 
Brewer contacted Coetzee, who was still in the USA, on 26 March 2001 via e-mail 
and proposed that Coetzee allow him to use compiled data and parts of the source 
code he (Coetzee) had developed for the Data Explorer programme, to enable 
Brewers Ltd to write a new computer programme, in return for a royalty payment. 
Coetzee and Brewers Ltd then entered into a written agreement in July 2001. Brewer 
appointed a local developer, Hank Bento, who developed its new programme, which 
became known as the Brewer's AMPS program. Bento conceded that he made use 
of the source codes provided by Coetzee. At that time, the latest AMPS data became 
available and Brewers Ltd acquired this data and sent it to Coetzee who converted 
the data from the UFL file to an answers and weightings database.16 Coetzee had 
not yet converted this data for Haupt. By using the "tree-preparer" programme 
Coetzee also created a tree.txt file and returned the conversions and the tree.txt file 
to Brewers Ltd. In addition Coetzee supplied databases which had previously been 
created for the Data Explorer programme to Brewers Ltd.17 Brewers Ltd marketed its 
Brewer's AMPS programme, together with all the converted data and tree.txt files. 
Haupt's programme malfunctioned due to the presence of a similar programme, 
namely the Brewer's AMPS programme.18 At this stage Haupt became aware of the 
alleged copyright infringements. He applied to the court a quo for an order 
interdicting the respondents from infringing his alleged copyright in the computer 
programme, Data Explorer, and various databases. The court a quo held that 
Haupt's claim could not be sustained and dismissed the application.19 It is this 
decision of the court a quo which gave rise to the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal under discussion. 
                                                          
15  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 41. 
16  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 4. 
17  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 14. 
18  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 15. 
19  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 1. 
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3 Decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
 
Two main issues had to be considered by the court. Firstly, the court had to 
determine whether or not the court a quo was correct in its assessment of the law 
and consequently its judgment. Secondly, and depending on its finding against the 
judgment of the court a quo, the court had to decide if a remedy availed the 
appellant. 
 
The court commenced with an analysis of the facts and the judgment of the court a 
quo. It noted that the Project AMPS program, as it existed on 31 July 1998, 
constituted a computer programme eligible for copyright.20 This was so, regardless of 
the fact that it sometimes produced incorrect results and "sections of the raw data" 
could not be read at all. Ownership in the Project AMPS programme vested in 
Brewers Ltd, as Coetzee was an independent contractor working for Brewers Ltd 
when the programme was first developed, and the company controlled the progress 
of the project through Haupt. 
 
The court also held that the court a quo erred in holding that Haupt could not acquire 
copyright in the Data Explorer programme, as the programme was an improvement 
and refinement of the Project AMPS programme.21 If a work is eligible for copyright, 
an improvement or refinement of that work would similarly be eligible for copyright, 
even if the improved work involved an infringement of copyright in the original work, 
if it satisfies the requirement of originality.22 The term "original" does not mean that 
the work must be "new" and hence creativity is not a requirement per se to make a 
work original. The court referred to the Canadian case CCH Canadian Ltd v Law 
Society of Upper Canada23 in which "original" was also interpreted as not requiring 
creativity, in which it was held: 
 
                                                          
20  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 23. 
21  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 25. 
22  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 24. The Act 
does not contain a definition of the term "original." While it is clear that the work must 
originate from the author and not be copied from an existing source, it is not every work 
which is not copied that qualifies for protection in terms of the Act. 
23  CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada 2004 1 SCR 339 para 25. 
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[A]n original work must be the product of an author's exercise of skill and judgment. 
The exercise of skill and judgment required to produce the work must not be so 
trivial that it could be characterised as a purely mechanical exercise. While creative 
works will by definition be "original" and covered by copyright, creativity is not 
required to make a work "original." 
 
Where a work is an improvement or refinement of original work, the alteration to the 
original work must be substantial.24 The court referred to Interlego A G v Tyco 
Industries Inc,25 where the Privy Council said in respect of an alteration to an artistic 
work: 
 
There must in addition be some element of material alteration or embellishment 
which suffices to make the totality of the work an original work. Of course, even a 
relatively small alteration or addition quantitatively may, if material, suffice to 
convert that which is substantially copied from an earlier work into an original work. 
Whether it does so or not is a question of degree having regard to the quality rather 
than the quantity of the addition. But copying, per se, however much skill or labour 
may be devoted to the process, cannot make an original work. 
 
The court concluded that the converter programme and the tree preparer programme 
were the products of substantial skill, judgment and labour.26 The Data Explorer 
programme, though an improvement or refinement of the Project AMPS programme, 
therefore satisfied the originality requirement and attracted copyright in its own right. 
An author may therefore make use of existing material and yet achieve originality in 
respect of the product which he produces. The work produced must be more than a 
mere imitation of the earlier work. The novelty must in some measure be due to the 
application of the author's own skill, judgment or labour.27 
 
The Court also noted that after 31 July 1998 Haupt exercised control over the writing 
of the computer programme.28 For this reason, copyright in the Data Explorer 
programme, which included the search instructions and the graph instructions and 
also the copyright in the converter and the tree preparer programme, vested in 
                                                          
24  Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group PLC  2002 4 SA 249 (SCA) 257H-I. 
25  Interlego A G v Tyco Industries Inc 1989 AC 217 (PC) 263. 
26  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 36. The court 
thus applied the "sweat of the brow" test, which is still firmly entrenched in South African 
copyright law. 
27  Precisely how much skill or labour he needs to contribute will depend upon the facts of each 
particular case. See also Appleton v Harnischfeger Corporation 1995 2 SA 247 (A) 262. 
28  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 41. 
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Haupt.29 By reproducing part of the Data Explorer programme in the Brewer's AMPS 
programme, Brewers Ltd and Brewer infringed Haupt's copyright in the Data Explorer 
programme.30 Coetzee assisted Brewer and Brewers Ltd in infringing Haupt's 
copyright in the Data Explorer programme by providing the source code in respect of 
the search function and also the source code required to incorporate the graphics 
server.31 In the premises Coetzee made common cause with Brewer and Brewers 
Ltd and co-operated with them in so far as the infringement by them of Haupt's 
copyright in the Data Explorer programme was concerned. By so doing, Coetzee 
also infringed Haupt's copyright in the Data Explorer programme.32 Having decided 
that copyright in the Data Explorer programme vested in Haupt and that all three 
respondents infringed Haupt's copyright in the programme,33 the court granted an 
interdict and ordered the respondents inter alia to deliver up all infringing copies of 
the work to the applicant within seven days.34 
 
4 Analysis of and comment on the decision 
 
The court a quo gave scant attention to the real issues of the case. These were, 
however, tackled by the Supreme Court of Appeal. In the ensuing discussion the 
main issues clarified by the court are analysed seriatim. 
 
Firstly, clarity was brought on the definition of "computer programmes" as contained 
in the Act. Until 1992 the Act listed "computer programmes" as literary works. 
Currently computer programmes are listed separately and enjoy copyright protection 
in South Africa as a sui generis copyright item.35 The Act now describes a literary 
work as a work which "includes, irrespective of literary quality and in whatever mode 
or form expressed, tables and compilations, including tables and compilations of 
data stored or embodied in a computer or a medium used in conjunction with a 
                                                          
29  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 42. 
30  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 45. 
31  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 46. 
32  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 46. 
33  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) paras 45-46. 
34  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 51. 
35  Section 2(1) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. See also Northern Office Microcomputers v Rosenstein 
1981 4 SA 123 (C). Pistorius and Visser 1992 SA Merc LJ 346 have questioned the wisdom 
of creating this niche category. See also Tong 2005 SALJ 513, 519. 
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computer, but not a computer programme."36 Computer programmes are defined in 
the Act as "a set of instructions fixed or stored in any manner and which, when used 
directly or indirectly in a computer, directs its operation to bring about a result."37 The 
court clarified the fact that a programme could constitute a computer programme 
eligible for copyright even if it produces incorrect results.38 Thus, the Act simply 
requires that the programme produces a "result". The question of whether or not the 
result is correct is irrelevant to the enquiry. Although the Act defines "computer 
programme," it does not define the term "computer."39 One of the drawbacks of 
leaving "computer" undefined is that the unauthorised use of computer programmes 
contained in items like vehicles and telephones that have computerised security 
devices could well be within its ambit. There is therefore need for certainty. However, 
a foreseeable challenge that the legislative authority may face is the difficulty in 
formulating a satisfactory definition that possesses sufficient flexibility to 
accommodate advances in computer technology. In the light of this challenge, it is 
recommended that the definition be broadly worded so as not to become obsolete 
with rapid technological change. 
 
Secondly, the fact that copyright law treats computer programmes and databases 
differently was also highlighted. The distinction is important when determining the 
author of a work as the term "author" does not bear the meaning of "the person who 
first makes or creates a work" in all cases, but depends on the nature of the work.40  
In the case of a computer programme, ex lege, and in the absence of a written 
agreement between the parties, the author is "the person who exercised control over 
the making of the computer programme."41 This is not true of databases, which are 
literary works whose authors are the persons who actually first make or create 
                                                          
36  Section 1(1)(xxviii) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
37  Section 1(1)(x) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. This current definition for a computer program in the 
Act is in conflict and suggests a shift away from the definition of a computer program in the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Annex 1C of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco 
on 15 April 1994) which does not divorce computer programs from literary works. There is 
therefore a difference between the South African and international handling of the protection of a 
computer program. 
38  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 31. 
39  The definition is left to the courts who are expected to adopt the contemporary meaning of the 
word. 
40  Section 1(1)(iv) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
41  Section 1(1)(iv)(i)) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. This can be distinguished from the author of a book, 
who is the person who first makes or creates the work. 
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them.42 The court held that while Haupt had copyright in the Data Explorer 
programme, Coetzee owned the copyright in the databases used by the 
programme.43 The practical effect of this distinction is an example of legislation not 
keeping pace with reality, because almost all computer programmes access a 
database of some kind. In this regard, the wisdom in divorcing computer 
programmes from literary works is questioned.44 
 
The relevance of determining the author of a work also lies in the fact that in the 
ordinary course of events, authorship and the first ownership of copyright will 
inhere in the same person.45 However, this is not inevitable, and in certain 
exceptional circumstances authorship and first ownership may be separated.46 
An exception which applies to computer programmes concerns the case of a 
work "made in the course of the author's employment" by another person under a 
contract of employment. In this event, the employer is "the owner of any 
copyright subsisting in the work."47 In the case of King v South African Weather 
Services48 the court pronounced on the meaning of the phrase "in the course of 
employment," as found in section 21(1)(d) of the Act.49 It was held that for the 
purposes of the section, the answer to the question of what constitutes being "in 
the course of employment" remains primarily a factual issue that depends not 
only on the terms of the employment contract but also on the particular 
circumstances in which the work was created. It appeared to the judge to be 
dangerous to formulate generally applicable rules to determine whether or not a 
work was authored in the course of the employee's employment.50 The 
conclusion that the inquiry is a factual matter was justified on the basis of the 
                                                          
42  Section 1(1)(iv)(a) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
43  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 39. 
44  See also Pistorius and Visser 1992 SA Merc LJ 346; Tong 2005 SALJ 513, 519. 
45  Section 21(1)(a) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
46  Section 21(1)(b)-(d) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
47  Section 21(1)(d) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. Parties are, however, allowed to contract out of 
the section 21(1)(d) provision. In this way, an employer may agree that an employee will be 
the first owner of the copyright in a work that has been made in the course of employment - 
see s 21(1)(e) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
48  King v South Africa Weather Services 2009 3 SA 13 (SCA). 
49  King v South Africa Weather Services 2009 3 SA 13 (SCA) paras 8-9. 
50  King v South Africa Weather Services 2009 3 SA 13 (SCA) para 17, with reference to 
Trewhella Bros (UK) Ltd v Deton Engineering (Pty) Ltd  57 JOC (A); Stephenson Jordan & 
Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans 1952 69 RPC 10 (CA); Noah v Shuba 1991 FSR 14 
(Ch); Morewear Industries (Rhodesia) Pvt Ltd v Irvine 1960 BPR 202 (Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland). 
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principle that the scope of employment may change explicitly or by implication 
during the course of employment.51 Such changes may have a bearing on 
whether or not a particular work was created during the course of employment 
and consequently on whether the author or the employer is the copyright owner. 
While this may be the case, it is cautioned that such an approach may have the 
undesirable effect that in any given case, a factual analysis that goes beyond the 
provisions of the employment contract would also need to be conducted. 
 
Thirdly, it was highlighted that a person may because of his "control" over the 
making of a computer programme be the owner of that programme even if the 
creator of the programme is an independent contractor, as in all situations there 
will have to be a factual enquiry as to who actually has control over the way in 
which the maker creates the computer programme.52 The issue is whether or not 
the contribution of the independent contractor to the making is sufficient for  a 
factual finding of control. In concluding that Haupt exercised control over the 
making of the amendments to the computer programme and was therefore the 
copyright owner of such amendments, the court considered various factors 
relating to the working relationship of the parties.53 
 
Fourthly, the court clarified the fact that in terms of the Act, if a work is eligible for 
copyright, an adaptation54 of that work may also be eligible for copyright,55 even if the 
                                                          
51  King v South Africa Weather Services 2009 3 SA 13 (SCA) para 23. 
52  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 41. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal supported the view of the court a quo that the person who 
exercises control over the making of a computer programme is the person who has the 
power of regulation of the matter in which the person who makes the programme is to do his 
or her work. One therefore does not need to be a computer programmer to be able to 
control the writing of a computer programme. 
53  For example, Haupt instructed Coetzee as to the end result that was to be achieved. 
Coetzee did technical work and improvements. All along, Coetzee was in constant contact 
with Haupt and he accepted and executed detailed instructions from Haupt. Coetzee 
submitted his work to Haupt, who approved and checked the work submitted. In the 
properties section of the Data Explorer Programme, Coetzee indicated that Haupt 's 
business owned the copyright. The allegation that Haupt was the copyright owner was 
never disputed. Haupt could at any time prescribe in which direction the development 
should proceed or could terminate further development, if he so wished. Haupt was 
therefore in a position of authority over Coetzee. Coetzee also worked for Haupt on a full -
time basis for two months for a monthly salary of R20 000. The combination of all these 
factors led the Supreme Court of Appeal to conclude that Haupt was the owner of the 
copyright in the computer programme. 
54  Although the court used the terms "improvement" and "refinement," for the purposes of this 
case note the term "adaptation" is preferred, as it is the term used in the Act. 
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adaptation involved an infringement of copyright in the original work,56 if it satisfies 
the requirement of originality.57 On this basis, Haupt therefore acquired copyright in 
the Data Explorer notwithstanding the fact that the programme was as a result of an 
unauthorised adaptation of the Project AMPS programme, which belonged to 
Brewers Ltd. A matter of concern that arises is the possibility of an author's being 
sued for infringement even though he has acquired copyright in a work that he has 
created by making unauthorised adaptations to another's copyright material. This 
issue relates on the one hand to the question of whether or not unauthorised 
adaptations infringe copyright. On the other hand it relates to the question of whether 
or not the law adequately protects copyright owners in situations where infringement 
takes the form of unauthorised adaptations of computer programmes. These matters 
are now discussed. 
 
In terms of the Act, "copyright is infringed by any person, not being the owner of the 
copyright and who, without licence, does or causes any other person to do, in the 
Republic, any act which the owner has exclusive rights to do or to authorise."58 
Copyright vests in the owner of copyright in a computer programme the exclusive 
right to do or to authorise the doing of the following acts:59 
 
(a) Reproducing the computer programme in any manner or form; 
(b) Publishing the computer programme if it was hitherto unpublished; 
(c) Performing the computer programme in public; 
(d) Broadcasting the computer programme; 
(e) Causing the computer programme to be transmitted in a diffusion service, unless 
such service transmits a lawful broadcast, including the computer programme, and 
is operated by the original broadcaster; 
(f) Making an adaptation of the computer programme; 
(g) Doing, in relation to an adaptation of a computer programme, any of the acts 
specified in relation to the computer programme in paragraphs (a) to (e) inclusive; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
55  A basic requirement for obtaining copyright protection is that a work must be "original" (s 2(1)). 
Other requirements are that (a) the work must be a work listed in s 2 of the Act as work which is 
eligible for copyright protection; (b) the work must be reduced to a material form (s 2(2); (c) in 
addition, copyright must have been conferred by virtue of nationality, domicile or residence (s 3) 
or as a result of first publication of the work being in South Africa or any Berne Convention 
country (s 4). If the aforementioned criteria are met then copyright protection in a computer 
programme will be obtained. There is no need to register the copyright and, in fact, there is no 
mechanism whereby one can register copyright in a computer programme. 
56  Section 2(3) Copyright Act 68 of 1978 provides: "A work shall not be ineligible for copyright 
by reason only that the making of the work, or the doing of any act in relat ion to the work, 
involved an infringement of copyright in some other work." 
57  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA) para 24. 
58  Section 23(1) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
59  Section 11B (a)-(h) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
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(h) Letting, or offering or exposing for hire by way of trade, directly or indirectly, a 
copy of the computer programme. 
 
Of relevance to the facts of the case is the right to make an adaptation or to 
authorise the making of an adaptation of the computer programme, which is to be 
found in section 11B(f) above. In terms of the Act "adaptation" in relation to a 
computer programme includes "the making of a version of the programme in a 
programming language, code or notation different from that of the programme or a 
fixation of the programme in or on a medium different from the medium of fixation of 
the programme."60 Where unauthorised adaptations take place, the copyright 
owner's right to make or authorise the making of an adaptation of the computer 
programme61 is infringed regardless of the intentions of the infringer. The 
consequences of the unauthorised adaptations are irrelevant to the enquiry, whether 
or not copyright infringement took place. In other words, the fact that Haupt's Data 
Explorer programme satisfied the originality requirement and attracted copyright in 
its own right is irrelevant to the enquiry into whether or not Haupt infringed Brewers 
Ltd's copyright. 
 
The fact that one develops an original computer programme from the unauthorised 
adaptations is not a justification for infringing copyright. The copyright owner of the 
adapted computer programme should sue for criminal liability an author who has 
acquired copyright in a work that he created by making an unauthorised adaptation 
to the former's copyright material. However, in terms of section 27(1) of the Act, the 
copyright owner of the adapted computer programme cannot sue such an author for 
criminal liability.62 In the discussion that follows, it will be determined whether or not 
the law adequately protects copyright owners in situations where infringement takes 
the form of unauthorised adaptations of computer programmes. 
 
                                                          
60  Section 1(1) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
61  Section 11B(f) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
62  While civil remedies are available (ss 24-26), the benefits of criminalisation should not be 
overlooked. 
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5 Unauthorised adaptations - is criminalisation a solution? 
 
Infringement of copyright can lead to criminal liability in terms of section 27(1) of the 
Act, which provides as follows: 
 
Any person who at a time when copyright subsists in a work, without the authority of 
the owner of the copyright- 
(a) makes for sale or hire; 
(b) sells or lets for hire or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire; 
(c) by way of trade exhibits in public; 
(d) imports into the Republic otherwise than for his private or domestic use; 
(e) distributes for purposes of trade; or 
(f) distributes for any other purposes to such an extent that the owner of the 
copyright is prejudicially affected, articles which he knows to be infringing copies of 
the work, shall be guilty of an offence. 
 
The maximum penalty that may be imposed on conviction for this offence is a fine or 
imprisonment for a period of three years in the case of first offenders.63 In the case of 
repeat offenders the maximum penalty is a fine or imprisonment for a period of five 
years. The fine can amount to a maximum of R60 000-00 for first offenders and 
R100 000-00 for repeat offenders.64 The Act also provides for civil remedies to 
address infringements of copyright.65 The remedies provided for include actions for 
damages, interdicts, actions for the delivery of infringing copies and any other 
actions which will be at the disposal of a plaintiff in respect of infringements of 
proprietary rights.66 
 
The protection granted a copyright owner by the Act is narrowly defined. It is only 
when one of the actions described in section 27(1) is committed in respect of an 
infringing copy of a computer programme that an offence in terms of the Act is 
committed. This means that criminal liability in terms of section 27(1) presupposes 
two elements, namely the existence of an "infringing copy" of a computer 
programme, and the unauthorised selling, letting for hire or distribution of such a 
copy. The elements of the offence in section 27(1) do not in any way relate to the 
adaptation of computer programmes. In this sense, protection of copyright in a 
                                                          
63  Section 27(6) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
64  Section 27(6) Copyright Act 68 of 1978 read with s 1 of the Adjustment of Fines Act 101 of 
1991. 
65  Sections 24-26 Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
66  Section 24(1) Copyright Act 68 of 1978. 
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computer programme is not wide enough to prevent unauthorised adaptations of 
computer programmes. 
 
In the light of the above considerations, the issue which needs to be considered is 
whether unauthorised adaptations of computer programmes per se should attract a 
criminal sanction. One aspect of the issue is whether or not it is justifiable to sanction 
this action with criminal penalties. The other is whether or not it is necessary to 
create a new offence to criminalise this action, if it is accepted that the action should 
lead to criminal liability. In addressing these questions, guidance will be sought from 
the legal position in the UK on the issue of unauthorised adaptation of computer 
programmes. The UK has enacted legislation that particularly addresses computer 
crime.67 The question arises: should South Africa follow the same example? 
 
6 Copyright in computer programmes in the UK 
 
Computer programmes have been subject to copyright protection in the UK as 
literary works at least since the Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 
1985 came into force. In the discussion below, the current Act regulating copyright in 
computer programmes in the UK is discussed. 
 
6.1 The Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988 
 
Copyright in the UK is governed by the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 198868 in 
terms of which computer programmes enjoy copyright protection as literary works.69 
Copyright subsists in an original literary work,70 including a computer programme,71 
                                                          
67  The Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
68  Hereinafter the CDP Act. This Act was amended by the Copyright (Computer Programmes) 
Regulations (1992) to implement the European Union (EU) Software Directive (Council 
Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protect ion of computer programs, now 
replaced by European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009). The 
CDP Act must be read in accordance with the Directive. In turn, the Directive must be read 
in accordance with both the TRIPS Agreement (1994) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaty (1996), both of which are binding on the EU. See 
Manches Plus 2011 www.manches.com. 
69  This position differs from that in South Africa, where computer programmes are currently 
listed separately and enjoy copyright protection as sui generis copyright items (s 2(1) Copyright 
Act 68 of 1978). 
70  Section 1(1)(a) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
71  Section 3(1)(b) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
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preparatory design material for a computer programme,72 a database73 and a table 
or compilation other than a database.74 There is, however, no copyright unless and 
until the work is recorded.75 Section 16 invests the owner of the copyright with the 
exclusive right to perform inter alia the following acts:76 to copy the work,77 to issue 
copies of the work to the public,78 and to make an adaptation of the work.79 
Copyright in a work is infringed by a person who without the licence of the copyright 
owner does or authorises another to do any of the acts restricted by the copyright.80 
An infringement of copyright is actionable by the copyright owner.81 The Act provides 
for civil remedies to address infringements of copyright82 as well as criminal liability 
for making or dealing with infringing articles.83 
 
Section 107 of the CDP Act provides as follows: 
 
(1) A person commits an offence who, without the licence of the copyright owner – 
(a) Makes for sale or hire, or 
(b) Imports into the United Kingdom otherwise than for his private and domestic use, 
or 
(c) Possesses in the course of a business with a view to committing any act 
infringing the copyright, or 
(d) In the course of a business – 
(i) Sells or lets for hire, or 
(ii) Offers or exposes for sale or hire,  
(iii) Exhibits in public, or 
(iv) Distributes, or 
(e) Distributes otherwise than in the course of a business to such an extent as to 
affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright,  
an article which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe is, an infringing 
copy of a copyright work. 
 
Although section 107 of the CDP Act is phrased differently from section 27(1) of the 
Act, they are similar in that criminal liability in terms of both sections presupposes the 
existence of an infringing copy and the unauthorised distribution of such a copy. The 
                                                          
72  Section 3(1)(c) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
73  Section 3(1)(d) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
74  Section 3(1)(a) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
75  Section 3(2) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
76  Referred to as "acts restricted by the Act." 
77  Section 16(1)(a) read with s 17 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
78  Section 16(1)(b) read with s 18 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
79  Section 16(1)(e) read with s 21 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
80  Section 16(2) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
81  Section 96(1) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
82  Section 97 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
83  Section 107 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
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criminal offence in terms of section 107, like that in terms of section 27(1), does not 
in any way relate to the unauthorised adaptation of computer programmes. Thus, 
while the CDP Act grants the copyright owner the right to make an adaptation of the 
work84 and makes it clear that unauthorised adaptations infringe copyright,85 it does 
not criminalise the act of making unauthorised adaptations. In this regard, the 
protection of copyright in terms of section 107 is also not wide enough to prevent 
unauthorised adaptations of computer programmes. 
 
This apparent inability of the CDP Act to cope with such offences was highlighted in 
a number of failed prosecutions.86 The case of R v Gold87 is significant in that it led 
to the Computer Misuse Act being developed and passed into law in 1990. In this 
case, Gold and Schifreen, using conventional home computers, gained unauthorised 
access to the British Telecom Prestel account. They were charged under section 188 
of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 and convicted. They appealed, claiming 
inter alia that the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act had been misapplied to their 
conduct. They were acquitted but the prosecution appealed to the House of Lords, 
which upheld the acquittal in 1988. The Forgery and Counterfeiting Act was found 
not to have been intended for computer misuse offences.89 Lord Brandon of 
Oakbrook held:90 
 
We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the language of the Act was not 
intended to apply to the situation which was shown to exist in this case.  The 
submissions at the close of the prosecution case should have succeeded. It is a 
conclusion which we reach without regret.  The Procrustean attempt to force these 
facts into the language of an Act not designed to fit them produced grave difficulties 
for both judge and jury which we would not wish to see repeated. The appellants' 
conduct amounted in essence… to dishonestly gaining access to the relevant 
Prestel data bank by a trick.  That is not a criminal offence.  If it is thought desirable 
to make it so, that is a matter for the legislature rather than the courts. 
 
                                                          
84  Section 16(1)(e) read with s 21 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
85  Section 16(2) Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. 
86  See for example R v Gold 1988 1 AC 1063 and Cox v Riley 1986 CLR 460. 
87  R v Gold 1988 1 AC 1063. 
88  The section provides that a person is guilty of forgery if he makes a false instrument, with the 
intention that he or another shall use it to induce somebody to accept it as genuine, and by 
reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person's prejudice. 
89  The problem was that the machine was the "deceived" and the "false instrument" at the 
same time. Normally in a forgery case it is necessary to prove that some person was 
deceived. 
90  R v Gold 1988 1 AC 1063. 
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In the light of the judgment in this case, it therefore became clear that this was an 
area where new and appropriate legislation was required. A Law Commission was 
set up to look at the area of computer misuse and as a result of its findings and 
recommendations the Computer Misuse Act was enacted.91 
 
6.2 The Computer Misuse Act 1990 
 
The Computer Misuse Act92 was created specifically to deal with computer crime. 
The CMA introduced the following new criminal offences: unauthorised access to 
computer material;93 unauthorised access to computer material with intent to commit 
or facilitate commission of further offences;94 and unauthorised modification of 
computer material.95 The offence of unauthorised modification of computer material 
was dealt with in section 3 of the CMA which provided as follows: 
 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if- 
(a) he does any act which causes an unauthorised modification of the contents of 
any computer; and 
(b) at the time when he does the act he has the requisite intent and requisite 
knowledge. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite intent is an intent to 
cause a modification of the contents of any computer and by so doing- 
(a) to impair the operation of any computer; 
(b) to prevent or hinder access to any programme or data held in any computer; or 
(c) to impair the operation of any such programme or the reliability of any such data. 
(3) The intent need not be directed at- 
(a) any particular computer; 
(b) any particular programme or data or a programme or data of any particular kind; 
or 
(c) any particular modification or a modification of any particular kind. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite knowledge is 
knowledge that any modification he intends to cause is unauthorised. 
 
The above section was replaced by a new section 3 which was introduced by section 
36 of the Police and Justice Act 2006.96 The new section 397 now provides for the 
                                                          
91  Law Commission (UK) 1989 www.underground-book.net. 
92  Hereafter CMA. 
93  Section 1 Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
94  Section 2 Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
95  Section 3 Computer Misuse Act 1990. The focus of this case note is on unauthorised adaptation 
(modification) of computer material. The other crimes in terms of this Act will therefore not be 
discussed. 
96  See Police and Justice Act 2006. 
97  The relevant provision came into force on 1 October 2008.  
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offence of "unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to 
impairing, operation of computer etc."98 The reason was to make Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attacks99 illegal. This was necessary as the original section 3 did not make it 
clear whether DoS attacks were an offence.100 The offence101 is thus, now committed 
by a person who does any unauthorised act relating to a computer, knowing that the 
act is unauthorised, and intending the act to cause, or being reckless as to whether 
the act will cause one of the following; (a) the impairment of the operation of any 
computer; (b) the prevention or hindering of access to any programme or data held 
in any computer; (c) the impairment of the operation of any such programme or the 
reliability of any such data; or (d) the enablement of any of the things mentioned in 
(a) to (c). Unauthorised modification of computer programmes constitutes an offence 
under this section. 
 
7 Proposed way forward for South Africa – fitting in the missing piece 
 
It has been indicated above that in the UK unauthorised modifications of computer 
programmes are subject to a criminal sanction. It is proposed that the same position 
should prevail in South Africa, but that this purpose should be achieved using an 
approach different from the one adopted in the UK. Instead of developing a 
"Computer Misuse Act" or new legislation for this purpose, it is proposed that the 
South African Copyright Act be amended by inserting section 27(1)(A) providing for 
the offence of unauthorised adaptations of computer programmes. The reasons are 
twofold. Firstly, section 27(1) does not include unauthorised adaptations of computer 
programmes in its ambit of criminal liability. Having the proposed section 27(1)(A) 
follow immediately after section 27(1) dovetails the two sections and closes the gap 
left by section 27(1). Consequently, the penalties stipulated in section 27(6) would 
also apply. Secondly, the issue of unauthorised adaptations is one that can 
adequately be covered in the Act. It is therefore strongly felt that there is no need to 
develop new legislation for this purpose. 
                                                          
98  See the Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
99  These are attacks which overload a computer with data so it can no longer function 
properly. 
100  See Director of Public Prosecutions v Lennon 2006 EWHC 1201 (Admin). 
101  The new s 3 offence as introduced by the Police and Justice Act 2006. 
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When phrasing the proposed section careful consideration should be given to the 
manner in which the elements of the offence of unauthorised adaptation of computer 
programmes is described. It is proposed that the criminal action be widely defined. It 
should not be limited by reference to specific consequences. In other words, the Act 
should criminalise unauthorised adaptations without regard to the consequences. 
The suggestion is based on the fact that in terms of section 11B(f) of the Act 
unauthorised adaptations infringe copyright regardless of the consequences of such 
infringements.102 It is therefore only reasonable that the proposed criminal action 
should draw from section 11B(f). It is further proposed that the criminal action should 
not contain as one of its components "actual damage" resulting from the adaptations. 
However, the fact that an unauthorised adaptation caused damage should be a 
factor to take into account upon sentencing in any given case. 
 
The unlawfulness of the adaptation must consist of the absence of authority to make 
the adaptation in question. With regard to the issue of culpability, it is recommended 
that the required form of culpability for the proposed offence of 'unlawful adaptation 
of a computer program' should be intent.  Intent would naturally include knowledge of 
the unlawfulness of the modification. The accused must, therefore, have known that 
he had no authority to cause the adaptation of the computer programme in question. 
The knowledge component of the intent for this offence should be interpreted 
sufficiently wide to make it clear that it includes cases of wilful blindness. 
Consequently the knowledge component should be interpreted to include 
circumstances where the accused ought to have known or suspected that he may 
not have had authority to make the adaptation but nevertheless proceeded with his 
actions, without confirming the presence or absence of the requisite authority. 
 
The discussions above lead to it being proposed that the Copyright Act be amended 
by inserting a new section criminalising unauthorised adaptations of computer 
programmes. It is recommended that the proposed section 27(1)(A) should read as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
102  It is in this regard that it has been argued that a copyright owner should sue an author who 
has acquired copyright in a work that he or she has created by making unauthorised 
modification to the former's copyright material. 
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(1) Any person, who at a time when copyright subsists in a computer programme, 
intentionally and without the authority of the owner of the copyright makes an 
adaptation of the computer programme, is guilty of an offence. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, the consequences of the unauthorised 
adaptation shall be irrelevant. 
 
It is submitted that the earlier discussion shows that this proposed section is the 
missing piece which needs to be fitted in, in order to close the gap that currently 
exists in South African law with regard to unauthorised adaptations of computer 
programmes.103 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
Although the law with regard to copyright in computer programmes was clarified in 
Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd,104 a number of 
unresolved issues also surfaced, as has been highlighted in this discussion. Of most 
significance is the shortcoming of the Act in its failure to provide adequate protection 
against unauthorised adaptations of computer programmes. It has been argued that 
the protection section 27(1) affords owners of the copyright in computer programmes 
is not wide enough to prevent unauthorised adaptations. It is recommended that the 
Act be amended by the insertion of a section 27(1)(A) which makes it an offence to 
make an unauthorised adaptation of a computer programme. 
                                                          
103  The procedural aspects of this proposed offence fall outside the scope of the article and are 
therefore not discussed.  
104  Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 (SCA). 
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